Showing posts with label risk perception. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk perception. Show all posts

Saturday, 12 April 2014

The Inefficiency of Compassion


After a large earthquake first news comes of fatalities and numbers people affected, but soon after estimations of the cost of the disaster are reported. This figure tends to rise as time passes, however usually the economic burden is much larger with indirect losses felt in the local communities affected, such as uninsured losses, loss of income, business downtime, etc. But could all of this financial loss be, in fact, not lost and instead used to develop and strengthen resilience in communities?

I heard a story once of a factory in Asia built for use by a western company. The highly seismic area was prone to large earthquakes, so to avoid losses through downtime the factory was built to the highest standards. When a large earthquake came, the factory was in good shape and able to open the next day. However, no one turned up to work. The staff had been made homeless, lost loved ones, were injured or some even killed. From this example it becomes obvious that strengthening works, but the effects of disaster are wider spread and, in order to achieve resilience, investment and strengthening needs to consider multiple aspects.

Recently, a headline used by Care International struck me:

'Fixing the Inefficiency of Compassion'.

The article highlights the ineffective use of funds in the aftermath of disasters, when the same money could protect so many more people and therefore avoid suffering by many. A previous blog post of mine explains that 'for every $1 spent on disaster preparedness, between $2 and $7 is saved in disaster response'. There are various other values calculated by different institutions but the commonality is that it is always better value for money to invest in DRR than to spend on post-disaster recovery.

But how do we fix this inefficient spending? How to we encourage aid donations to be made when there isn't yet suffering. Is it enough to say "Your dollar will go further if you give it now, before hurricane season". Would you donate then?

The organisation Build Change is one example of a proactive organisation that aims to protect communities, instead of helping to 'pick up the pieces'. They have a wealth of technical resources, inspiring projects and opportunities to be involved.

Supporting a charity like gives you the best value for money, almost like a bargain and we all love a bargain.




Friday, 10 January 2014

Risk perception…not the only important thing?

















Why would you live here?! Nestled near the bottom of the Vazcun valley, these homes are in a very high risk area on the slopes of Tungurahua, Ecuador.  Built on top of pyroclastic flow deposits, which have regularly impacted the area in historic times. There hasn't been one to this location for almost 100 years - so despite heightened activity since 1999, people are still here. Sadly - unless the volcano becomes extinct (not likely any time soon) - history will inevitably repeat itself. I just hope not in the near future....

What if I told you that my friend lives there...and his family extended their house...only a few years ago - i.e during a time when the volcano was erupting? What would you think? Would you suppose that my friend and his family don't really know how dangerous the volcano is? What if you then found out that my friend is a very promising volcanologist...? Why on earth would they live there and invest money in their property as they surely know the volcano is very dangerous?? 


I regularly find myself telling people that I am a little dismayed that a ‘risk perception study’ is often the first social science approach taken off the shelf by volcanologists. When we are considering risk reduction, what we want to know is how people might respond to a hazard or forecasted hazard, and what steps they are likely to take to reduce the risk to themselves and their family. How people perceive risk or the ‘potential danger’ from a volcano is important, but it shouldn’t be the first thing we investigate and for me, it doesn’t explain adequately why people might take certain decisions or actions when confronted by risk.

Perhaps I trivialise the issue, but here is one interpretation of what a typical risk perception study is probably looking at:

Survey question: How dangerous do you think the volcano is? 

Answer: not very

Solution? Educate them about volcanic hazards. If they knew how dangerous it was, they wouldn’t live or work there, or they would at least make sensible decisions when we tell them something.


We could even add in a quantitative element – because that of course allows us to really understand something:

Survey question: on a scale of 1- 10 , how dangerous do you think the volcano is? 

Answer: 5

Solution: oooh – if we can educate them so that their answer is the same as our answer (about 7) then they will be safer. Risk Reduction

In reality, the problem here isn’t actually about risk perceptions – it is about what we think they might tell us:

Thinking that people can have ‘bad’, ‘incorrect’ or ‘wrong’ risk perceptions isn’t helpful – it assumes that we all have the same way of calculating risk, or that there is some objective ‘true’ risk.

Assuming that we can ‘change’ or ‘improve’ people’s risk perceptions, to bring them more in line with scientists’ perceptions is a concept from straight out of the idiots guide to educating knowledge deficient publics:

The deficit model  of risk communication– suggests that the lay-public will make irrational decisions based on limited information about a problem.  This comes about because scientists often only consider objective science as the most important information. Whilst the amount of knowledge that the lay public has is a factor in their response, we have a responsibility to not disregard other factors as irrelevant. I very much doubt that we deliberately do this…but our obsessive focus on people’s risk perception doesn’t pay much attention to other things that might influence their decisions – as we know that the public’s judgments of risk aren’t necessarily based on the amount of information that they have, but more often than not on their ‘world view’, their social or political views and their circumstances*.  None of us, even scientists, simply process information with associated heuristics and biases, and then make a decision. We aren’t machines. Rather we like to attach meaning to issues. Further to this…much of how we make sense of the world is actually not individualistic, but a socially constructed reality. Particularly in volcanic areas, knowledge and meaning about risk is transferred between social groups, often passed down between generations. 

People create social representations about risk – reaching a consensual understanding of what did or could happen – we build common sense about an issue by anchoring and objectifying it. We anchor by drawing on shared experiences from the past, making an unfamiliar issue familiar amongst our group. Then we often objectify things, by representing them in a way that is easier to grasp, using more familiar terms. For example, people often objectify ash plumes, which are lit up and incandescent as “smoke and fire”. It may be different to the scientific reality, but anchoring and objectifying is the way in which social groups make sense of new or unfamiliar situations. For example, the way that a social group might have been affected in a previous evacuation and how they have made sense of it, may have a far greater effect on decisions they will make in a future risky situation. Thus, their risk perception of a volcano might suggest that they know it is incredibly dangerous, but if the community only talks about how last time there was an evacuation, they were looted or lost their animals, then how dangerous they perceive the volcano to be may have little baring on their decisions. If we simply asked them how dangerous the volcano is, we will get a false positive answer.

Where risk perceptions focus on knowledge and information, risk representations focus on meaning and understanding. What is more useful for us as volcanologists to know? How or why people might behave in a certain way, or what they know, which may or may not then affect how they behave?

I'm not suggesting that we don't try to understand risk perceptions - but let's try to not make it the first thing that we do. Instead what we could be looking for isn’t how dangerous people think a volcano is, but what do they think about it in relation to other hazards or life situations. When we frame the problem like this, we are able to attach meaning to people’s views about volcanic hazards - and then you can understand the factors determining why my friend and his family live where they live. 

  


To read more about social representations of risk, have a look at the paper below as a starter by Helene Joffe. Sorry if you can't access it...

Joffe, H., 2003. Risk: From perception to social representation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 42(1), pp.55–73.

*This is based on the work of Paul Slovic (among others)

Thursday, 2 January 2014

Would you live in this house?

Granted, it is on the idilic Caribbean island of St. Vincent, with an envious climate, glorious beaches and stunning landscapes, but it is also subject to infrequent but large earthquakes. 

As a structural engineer, my job is to ensure that structures withstand the forces of nature, whether that is wind, rain, snow, people, bathtubs full of water or seismic shaking. There are design rules, codes and standards, guidelines and common structural principles which apply to different loading scenarios throughout the world - for example snow loading in Cameroon will be different to that in Canada. 

For a structure to withstand seismic shaking there are a set of principles too. Survey of damage after destructive earthquakes can clearly highlight the reasons for failure, and so as each earthquake passes we learn more. One of these general principles is that, put simply, columns should be bigger than beams. Imagine a column failing, the floor structure will fall and likely bring the whole structure down with it. However if a beam fails, a localised section of floor might fall down but the columns are still intact, hence the structure may not undergo catastrophic collapse.

Another seismic design principle is to avoid 'soft storeys'. These are storeys of a building that have significantly less structural strength and stiffness, e.g. a tall office block with an open ground floor car park with less columns and no walls. When the building shakes, the soft storey is likely to give way and collapse and the building ends up a storey shorter. See here.

So look again at this house.

What do you think?


P.s. Other things that may be a worry: landslides, volcanic hazards, tsunamis, hurricanes, etc.